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Property Rights, Municipal Corporations 
and Judicial Review 
Lome GIROUX * 
Cet article étudie l'évolution récente du rôle joué par la Cour supérieure 
pour assurer la protection des droits individuels dans le secteur du droit de 
l'aménagement et celui du droit municipal. L'étude porte sur deux champs 
d'intervention publique sur les droits individuels, en particulier le droit de 
propriété, et illustre les modes divers d'intervention utilisés par la Cour 
supérieure dans son rôle de surveillance. 
D'une part, la Loi sur la protection du territoire agricole sert à illustrer 
un modèle d'aménagement sectoriel fondé sur l'usage de la discrétion 
administrative comme méthode de protection. L'intervention des tribunaux se 
révèle sous trois aspects. D'abord la Cour supérieure se préoccupe d'imposer un 
minimum de discipline aux procédures devant la Commission de protection du 
territoire agricole, surtout dans les cas où il peut en résulter des injustices. 
Ensuite, le droit d'accès aux tribunaux ordinaires est protégé par la Cour grâce 
en particulier à une interprétation restrictive de la juridiction de la Commission. 
Enfin, le droit de propriété lui-même est protégé par la Cour supérieure qui 
restreint les pouvoirs d'intervention de la Commission mais favorise une 
interprétation libérale des droits acquis. 
A l'opposé, les interventions des collectivités locales en matière d'amé-
nagement et d'urbanisme sont fondées sur le pouvoir réglementaire plutôt que 
sur la discrétion administrative. Même si le contrôle judiciaire sur le pouvoir 
réglementaire est un domaine déjà riche de tradition au Canada et au Québec, 
la jurisprudence récente tout en rappelant des principes déjà connus illustre 
également de nouvelles tendances. En effet, alors que les tribunaux continuent à 
préserver l'élément de certitude et de sécurité que le règlement fournit aux 
citoyens, ils sont prêts à protéger les citoyens contre les interventions publiques 
abusives et ils ont à cette fin revitalisé le critère de la rationalité comme mode 
de contrôle du pouvoir réglementaire. De plus, au besoin, ils vont être prêts à 
intervenir dans l'allocation même des usages et des affectations du sol lorsqu'ils 
doivent se prononcer sur des questions de discrimination et d'intérêt public. 
* Professeur à la Faculté de droit de l'Université Laval. Cet article a été écrit à l'occasion de la 
participation de l'auteur au troisième colloque de droit comparé Birmingham-Laval, tenu à 
l'Université de Birmingham, Birmingham, Angleterre, du 14 au 17 mai 1984. 
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Introduction 
While municipal law has always been a traditional area of judicial 
review by the Quebec courts, the past fifteen years have witnessed a dramatic 
increase in the scope of public intervention over private property rights 
resulting from the unprecedented development of planning law. Not only 
have local planning powers been increased and strenghtened but recent 
statutory trends have been oriented towards specific and single purpose 
legislation setting up administrative authorities with wide discretionary 
powers to deal with a sectorial planning problem such as environmental 
protection1, the preservation of cultural property2 and agricultural land3 
and the preservation of housing stock4. 
Parallel with these legislative developments one can notice a significant 
increase in planning litigation and the creation of a new planning case law by 
the Quebec courts. An overview of the rights and values protected by the 
1. Environment Quality Act, R.S.Q., ch. Q-2. 
2. Cultural Property Act, R.S.Q., ch. B-4. 
3. An Act to Preserve Agricultural Land, R.S.Q., ch. P-41.1. 
4. An Act Respecting the Régie du Logement, R.S.Q., ch. R-8.1. 
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Superior Court in the field of planning and municipal law in Quebec would 
reveal that the courts are still concerned with the protection of property 
rights but that they will also intervene to prevent undue invasions of privacy, 
abuse of discretion and unwarranted administrative harassment. Further-
more, even if the protection against the taking of property without compen-
sation is not entrenched in the Constitution Act of 19825 as in the United 
States6, the Courts have been very efficient in safeguarding this principle. 
As we shall see, some of the protective measures given by the Courts are 
procedural in character. This is especially the case when they are involved 
with due process issues and when they are requested to discipline the 
procedures of administrative agencies exercising powers of decision over 
private property. In other cases, the courts will tend to guarantee access to 
judicial review by restrictively interpreting administrative powers and juris-
diction. In some instances, they will use their discretion to sanction undue 
delays by local or other planning authorities in enforcing statutes or by-laws. 
But the courts will also get involved in substantive issues especially 
when exercising their supervisory powers over subordinate legislation. The 
concept of ultra-vires has been expanded in recent years so as to extend to 
new areas of judicial control. The Courts have always been very alert to 
prevent sub-delegation of regulatory powers and to prohibit attempts to 
transform powers to enact by-laws into administrative discretion. Lately, 
new life has been brought to the tests of unreasonableness and uncertainty as 
applied to the validity of planning regulations and these tests are dealing 
with substantive questions. Other substantive issues tackled by the Courts 
are those of public interest and the very important question of acquired 
rights which bring the courts to declare private properties or uses immune 
from planning policies embodied in by-laws. 
Such values and the means of protecting them can best be illustrated in 
different areas of municipal and planning law since there is a wide diversity 
of planning regimes and authorities having jurisdiction over private property 
in Quebec. 
Even if municipal corporations have a general jurisdiction over local 
matters, the last years have witnessed a proliferation of single purpose 
administrative authorities entrusted with powers to deal with a specific 
planning problem such as agricultural land protection or cultural property 
protection. These provincial planning powers and authorities have not only 
eroded the jurisdiction of local governments but they also have been 
5. Constitution Act. 1982, enacted as Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, (U.K.) 1982, ch. 11 
which came into force on April 17, 1982. 
6. Constitution of the United States, Amendments, Article V. 
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established and based on the use of administrative discretion as their 
principal planning tool while local authorities land use control powers are 
traditionaly regulatory and not discretionary in nature. Therefore, the 
problems faced by the Courts are very often different from one regime to the 
other. 
Our examination will focus on two main areas. Agricultural land 
protection will be the first subject of our study. Enacted at the end of 1978, 
the Agricultural Land Protection Act7 has had a very important impact on 
Quebec planning law both because of its scope and of the powers given to the 
commission then created. After outlining the Act we will try to identify the 
different areas and trends of judicial intervention. A second area of 
examination will be judicial control over local governments with particular 
focus on the supervisory role of the Courts over the exercise of municipal 
planning powers. 
1. Agricultural land protection 
In order to be able to illustrate the role and attitude taken so far by the 
Courts since the adoption of the Act to Preserve Agricultural Land1 it is 
necessary to give an outline of the statutory regime that it established. 
1.1. An outline of the Act to Preserve Agricultural Land 
1.1.1. The Commission de protection du territoire agricole du Québec 
Central in the new statute is the establishment of a new agency, the 
Commission de protection du territoire agricole du Quebec whose single 
function is to secure the preservation of the agricultural land of Quebec9. 
For that purpose, the Commission is empowered to decide an application for 
authorization made pursuant to the Act, to issue permits when they are 
required, to describe with the municipal corporation the permanent agri-
cultural zone of a municipality, to give notices or advice on matters referred 
to it by the Minister of agriculture and to supervise the administration of the 
Act. 
At the time of writing seven members sit on the Commission although 
the Act allows for a maximum of twelve. They are appointed by the 
provincial government for a term not exceeding five years 10. Three members 
7. Supra, note 3. 
8. Supra, note 3. 
9. Sect. 3. 
10. Section 4. 
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are a quorum of the Commission but the bulk of the work is done by 
divisions of at least two members one of whom is the President or one of the 
three vice-presidents. All matters submitted to the Commission can be dealt 
with in divisions except when it is requested to give an opinion or when the 
Commission sits in review of one of its decisions. The decision of a division 
must be unanimous or the matter is referred to the Commission where the 
president enjoys a casting vote in case of a tie-vote ". 
The Commission is empowered to make the investigations necessary for 
the exercise of its functions and can also hire investigators for that purpose. 
The members of the Commission are vested with the powers and immunities 
of commissioners appointed under the Act Respecting Public Inquiry Com-
missions 12. These include the powers to hold a public inquiry, summon 
witnesses, request the production of documents and take depositions under 
oath. 
1.1.2. Statutory restrictions and powers of the Commission 
For land to be subjected to the provisions of the Act to Preserve 
Agricultural Land, it must be specially designated as such. This designation is 
done in three stages. The Government first decrees a designated agricultural 
region out of which the Minister of Agriculture prepares a provisional plan 
identifying a reserved area for each municipality included in a designated 
agricultural region. After négociations between the Commission de protection 
du territoire agricole and each municipality, the Commission then submits to 
the Government, for approval, a plan for an agricultural zone in the 
municipality which is then approved by governmental decree 13. At the time 
of writing in almost all of the more than 1 500 municipalities subject to the 
Act the agricultural zone has been determined. 
For land that is included in a reserved area or in an agricultural zone, 
the statutory scheme to preserve its agricultural potential rests with the 
requirement that a number of operations over such land are prohibited 
without the authorization of the Commission de protection du territoire 
agricole du Quebec. In other words, rather than an absolute prohibition the 
statutory scheme is based on the granting of a permission such as is the case 
in the British planning system. While the Commission can decide that land 
be altogether excluded from the agricultural zone I4 in which case the land 
11. Sections 6 and 7. 
12. R.S.Q., ch. C-37. 
13. Agriculture Land Protection Act, supra, note 3, sections 22-25, 34-38 and 47-52. 
14. Sections 58, 62, 65, 67-69. 
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ceases to be subject to the statutory restrictions, in most instances requests 
made to the Commission are for individual authorizations to conduct some 
controlled operation on land included in a reserved area or in an agricultural 
zone. 
The basic restriction imposed by the Act is that no person may use a lot 
situated in a reserved area or an agricultural zone for a use other than 
agriculture without the authorization of the Commission 15. « Agriculture » 
under the Act means the cultivation of the soil and plants, leaving land 
uncropped or using it for forestry purposes, or the raising of livestock, and, 
for these purposes, the making, construction or utilization of works, 
structures or buildings, except residences 16. Protection is thus extended not 
only to land already under cultivation but also to any land with agricultural 
potential even if not in actual production since the fact of leaving it 
uncropped is deemed to be an agricultural use. Some specific uses are also 
the subject of special protection by the Act. Thus, section 27 states that no 
person may, except with the authorization of the commission, use a sugar 
bush in a protected area for any other purpose, nor fell maple trees therein, 
except for the purposes of selection or thinning within the framework of 
forest management. Thus, while the production of maple syrup or maple 
sugar does not require permission, the felling of trees for lumber in a sugar 
bush would require the authorization of the Commission. Topsoil conser-
vation is the object of a special division in the Act '7 which requires the 
issuing of an operating permit for the removal of topsoil for the purpose of 
sale from a lot protected by the Act or for the expansion of the area of such 
an operation already in progress 1S. The mere removal of lawn turf constitutes 
the removal of topsoil ". Among other conditions attached to the permit, the 
Commission may require that the applicant restore the land to its former 
condition as agricultural land before the date of expiry of the permit and that 
security be furnished20. 
It is not only the use of land that is controlled under the Act but, in 
order to limit the parcelling out of farmland, permission is required from the 
Commission to subdivide a lot and even to sell part of an estate. The 
rationale behind such drastic measures is that they are necessary to insure 
15. Sections 26, 39 and 54. 
16. Section 1(1°). 
17. Division V, sections 70-79. 
18. Section 70. A person conducting such an operation on the date of the coming into force of 
a designated agricultural region decree had six months to obtain an operating permit from 
the Commission : Section 71. 
19. Section 72. 
20. Section 74. 
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that agricultural estates are not dismembered to the point where agricultural 
exploitation ceases to be economical. 
Thus section 28 states that no person may, except with the authorization 
of the Commission, effect the subdivision of a lot protected under the Act. 
The concept of subdivision includes any parcelling out of a lot and 
encompasses the registration of a real servitude (easement) affecting part of 
that lot21 . Section 29 goes further. This time the owner of an estate 
composed of a number of lots protected under the Act may not, except with 
the authorization of the Commission, effect the alienation22 of a lot while 
retaining a right of alienation on a contiguous lot or on a lot that would 
otherwise be contiguous if it were not separated from the first by a public 
road, a railway, a public utility right of way or the surface of a lot in respect 
of which there exists an acquired or vested right. Under sections 28 and 29 an 
owner can thus alienate his whole lot or all his lots without authorization 
only if there is no parcelling out of one lot or if he does not retain a right of 
alienation on a contiguous lot. 
The essential feature of the Agricultural Protection Act is that it rests on 
the notion of administrative discretion. The Commission de protection du 
territoire agricole decides each request for authorization on its merits by 
applying a set of general criteria set out in the Act. The first and most 
important of these and one which in itself encompasses all others is given in 
section 3 specifying that the function of the Commission is to secure the 
preservation of the agricultural land of Quebec. All other criteria mentioned 
in the Act are always seen by the Commission in the light of its essential and 
only mandate to preserve agricultural land. 
Section 12 contains a list of criteria to be taken into consideration by the 
Commission in rendering a decision or giving its advice. It is to be noted that 
there is no order of priorities in the statutory enumeration nor is there any 
obligation by the Commission to make a decision on one or more criteria 
with respect to a specific request. Thus the very large discretion left with the 
Commission : 
« La discrétion octroyée à la Commission est donc encadrée par certains 
paramètres. II ne faut pas cependant se faire d'illusions. En pratique, il sera 
extrêmement difficile, sinon quasi impossible, de contrôler l'usage que fait la 
Commission de sa discrétion et ce, d'autant plus que le fardeau de la preuve 
repose sur l'administré et que l'institution ne remplit pas toujours de façon 
adéquate son obligation de motiver. Si le législateur avait le choix entre la 
souplesse réclamée par l'administration et la protection due aux droits des 
administrés, il nous paraît avoir choisi sans équivoque la première alternative. 
21. Section 1 (10°). 
22. For the definition of « alienation », see section 1 (3). 
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En effet non seulement ces facteurs sont flous et imprécis mais leur interpré-
tation est laissée à la discrétion de la Commission. De plus, il n'existe entre eux 
aucune pondération, aucune hiérarchie : il sera alors facile à la Commission de 
privilégier l'un ou l'autre à sa convenance selon les circonstances des différents 
dossiers»23. 
The biophysical conditions of the soil and of the environment, the 
possible uses of the lot for agricultural purposes and the economic conse-
quences thereof relate to the physical conditions of the soil as well as to the 
specific conditions of the lot involved in the application in terms of location 
for example. The repercussions that the granting of the application would 
have on the preservation of agricultural land in the municipality and in 
the region and on the homogeneity of the farming community and farming 
operations have led the Commission to evaluate the impact of requests 
according to their long term consequences and have been used as criteria to 
refuse applications that it felt detrimental because they would bring urban 
pressures on farming communities even if the specific area involved in the 
application for a residential use for instance had no agricultural value24. 
When the request is in respect of a lot which is situated in an 
agricultural zone, two other criteria may be examined by the Commission in 
considering an application for a use other than agriculture, subdivision, 
alienation, inclusion or exclusion. Those new criteria are the compatibility of 
the application with the use of the neighbouring lots and the consequences a 
refusal would have for the applicant but always « taking into account the 
criteria mentioned in section 12 »25. 
The Commission can attach to a decision on an application such 
conditions as it considers appropriate26. This power has been used extensively 
by the Commission to minimize the negative impact of an authorized 
operation on agriculture, to identify specific parcels of land affected by a 
decision or to insure that a lot be restored to its former condition. 
Subject to the right given the Commission to review its own decisions, 
the decisions of the Commissions on applications for authorizations or for 
exclusion or inclusion are final and without appeal27. 
23. J.M. LAVOIE et M. POIRIER, « La Loi sur la protection du territoire agricole et le droit 
public», in M. Poirier, éd.. Droit québécois de l'aménagement du territoire, Sherbrooke, 
Éditions Revue de Droit Université de Sherbrooke, 1983, 195, at p. 273. 
24. J. GASCON, Analyse des décisions de la Commission de protection du territoire agricole; les 
critères de décision. Unpublished essay, Programme de maîtrise en aménagement du 
territoire et développement régional, Université Laval, août 1980, pp. 8-10. 
25. Section 62. 
26. Sections 45 and 62. 
27. Sections 44 and 64. 
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1.1.3. Privileges and acquired rights 
As already noted, a residential use is excluded from the definition of 
agriculture in the Act28 and would thus require an authorization of the 
Commission before it can be established on a lot protected under the Act. To 
give a temporary measure of relief to owners of property who had acquired a 
piece of land before the Act came into force and to farmers who want to 
provide a residence for their children or employees, special provisions are 
made in the Act. 
Section 31 allows the owner of a vacant lot to erect one residence on 
such lot without the authorization of the Commission provided his land title 
is registered before the date his lot became subject to the Act and provided 
he does so before December 31, 1986 and uses for that purpose an area not 
exceeding one half-hectare. Furthermore in a reserved area or in an 
agricultural zone, a natural person whose principal occupation is agriculture 
may, without the authorization of the Commission, erect on his lot a 
residence for himself, for his child or for his employee. In the case of an 
agricultural corporation or partnership the same right can also be exercised 
for a shareholder or a member whose principal occupation is agriculture29. 
A very important Division IX of the Act is devoted to acquired rights. 
Its importance stems from the fact that a lot protected by vested or acquired 
rights can be used for a purpose other than agriculture, subdivided and 
alienated without the authorization of the Commission. 
Thus, according to section 101 a person may, without the authorization 
of the Commission, alienate, subdivide and use for a purpose other than 
agriculture a lot situated in a reserved area or in an agricultural zone to the 
extent that it was used or was already under a permit authorizing its use for a 
purpose other than agriculture when the provisions of the Act requiring the 
authorization of the Commission were made applicable to that lot. 
If the acquired right does not cover the whole of the lot, that part of the 
surface of the lot on which it exists can be enlarged to a half-hectare if the use 
for a purpose other than agriculture or a permit for such a purpose was 
residential on the relevant date for that lot. It can be enlarged to one hectare 
if its use or its authorized use under the permit was for commercial, 
industrial or institutional purposes30. The interruption or abandonment of 
the use other than agriculture or the change to another use other than 
agriculture does not extinguish an acquired right under the Act to Preserve 
28. Section 1 (1°). 
29. Section 40. 
30. Section 103. 
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Agricultural Land. It is however extinguished if the area over which it exists is 
left uncropped for over one year from the time when the provisions of the 
Act requiring the authorization of the Commission were made applicable to 
that lot31. 
Finally, section 29 provides that the surface of a lot in respect of which 
an acquired right is recognized is not deemed contiguous which means that 
such lot or a contiguous lot belonging to the same owner can thus be 
alienated without the authorization of the Commission while retaining a 
right of alienation on the other one. However, according to the same section, 
if two lots belonging to the same owner are separated by a lot on which 
acquired rights are recognized, they are not deemed contiguous to such lot 
but they are deemed contiguous to one another so requiring the authorization 
of the Commission before one of them is alienated while a right of alienation 
is retained on the other one. 
1.1.4. Enforcement 
To ensure enforcement of the Act a monitoring system is established 
whereby no municipal building permit can be issued nor can subdivision 
plans be approved unless the application be accompanied with a certificate 
of authorization from the Commission or a declaration by the applicant that 
no authorization is required, in the case of an operation allowed by sections 
31 or 40 for example, or when the owner has acquired rights. If the 
application for a municipal permit is accompanied by a declaration that no 
authorization is required from the Commission, the applicant must also 
furnish proof that a copy of such declaration has been transmitted to the 
Commission 32. This enables the Commission to inquire about the true 
factual situation. 
Should the Commission, through its investigators, become aware that 
there is a contravention to a provision of the Act or the conditions of an 
order or permit, it may issue an order enjoining that person, as the case may 
be, to effect no subdivision or work on the lot contemplated, to cease the 
contravention, to demolish the works already executed or to restore the lot 
to its former condition. The order is served on the person contemplated and 
a copy thereof is sent to the municipal corporation in whose territory the 
contravention is committed33. If there is no compliance with this order of the 
Commission, the Attorney-General, the Commission itself or the municipal 
corporation where the lot is situated, may, by motion, obtain from the 
31. Section 102. 
32. Sections 32, 39 and 56. 
33. Section 14. 
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Superior Court an order enjoining that person to comply with the order or 
even enjoining that work be done at the expense of the person subject to it34. 
Subdivision and alienation made in violation of sections 28 and 29 of 
the Act may be annulled by the Superior Court on the application of any 
interested person, including the Attorney-General, the Commission or the 
municipal corporation where the lot is situated. The Court may also order 
the cancellation of all rights, privileges and hypothecs (mortgages) created or 
resulting from any deed in violation of the prohibition of the Act as to use, 
subdivision, alienation and the removal of topsoil for the purpose of sale. 
The judgment declaring the nullity of a deed may also order that the lot be 
restored to its former condition at the expense of one or the other parties to 
the deed. If a person does not comply with the judgment, the Commission 
may have the necessary work done and upon registration of a notice against 
the lot the Government is entitled to a privilege (lien) against the lot for work 
done, expenses and interest35. 
Finally the penal provisions for enforcement are set out in sections 87 to 
94. Proceedings relating to offences are instituted in accordance with the 
Summary Conviction Act36 and stiff fines can be imposed. 
1.2. The role played by the Superior Court 
There is no doubt that the impact of the Act to Preserve Agricultural 
Land has been very important especially around the main urban centers of 
the Province where it has had the effect of stopping urban sprawl and the 
déstructuration of agricultural land. With respect to that goal the Act has 
been an unqualified success although there have been reservations about its 
usefulness in other outlying regions where agriculture as an economic 
activity is marginally viable at best37. 
On the other hand, the effectiveness of this piece of legislation is not the 
only concern for the lawyer. The means used to attain the end must also be 
evaluated in order to make a realistic assessment of the statute and the 
policies that are embodied in it. Of special relevance to the lawyer is the 
protection of individual rights. In the Act to Preserve Agricultural Land, there 
is no right of appeal to either an administrative tribunal or to the courts from 
34. Section 85. 
35. Sections 82-84. 
36. R.S.Q., ch. P-15. 
37. B. VACHON, La loi de la protection du territoire agricole (90) et le développement de l'espace 
rural dans les régions périphériques : le cas de l'est du Québec, Conférence prononcée au 
Congrès annuel de la société québécoise de Sciences politiques, A.C.F.A.S., Sherbrooke, 
13 mai 1981. 
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a decision of the Commission. The Commission itself may, for cause, review 
or revoke any decision or order after giving any person concerned the 
opportunity to make representations. Where a decision or an order whose 
review is applied for was not rendered after the holding of a public hearing, 
the Act requires the Commission to hold a public hearing in review if an 
interested party so requests. In its decisions the Commission de protection 
du territoire agricole has made it clear that such a power of review is not an 
appeal and will only be used when new facts or evidence are submitted or 
when one can establish that the original decision is affected by an error of 
law such as to cause an injustice38. This situation is in sharp contrast to what 
observers of the British Planning system and of other regimes based on 
administrative discretion have pointed out. They have noted that the esta-
blishment of such a system is accompanied by a number of guarantees including 
the right to appealî9. In England furthermore it appears that a statutory right 
of appeal to the courts on questions of law or jurisdiction has had the effect of 
disciplining adjudication processes without impairing the powers of admi-
nistrative authorities over substantive matters40. Thus only the traditional 
supervisory power of the Superior Court is left as a protection against abuses 
from the Commission and even that power is limited both by the existence of 
the privative clause of section 17 and by the extent of the discretion granted 
to the Commission. 
But even granted these difficulties, the courts, when called upon to 
exercise their supervisory powers, are becoming increasingly active in the 
protection of individual rights including property rights as against encroach-
ments in the name of agricultural land preservation. 
1.2.1. Disciplining the procedures before the Commission 
One of the main areas of concern for the Superior Court has been the 
procedures and the manner of exercise of its powers by the Commission. 
38. See : L.A. CORMIER et V. SYLVESTRE, Loi sur la protection du territoire agricole. 
Commentaires, décisions et jugements, Montréal, Wilson & Lafleur, 1984, 173 ; J.M. LA VOIE 
et M. POIRIER, supra, note 23, pp. 261-264. 
39. P. KENNIFF, « Le contrôle public de l'utilisation du sol et des ressources en droit 
québécois», (1976) 17 Cahiers de Droit, 85, 155. 
40. M. PURDUE, «The Respective Jurisdiction of the Courts and the Secretary of State for the 
Environment in Controlling the Exercise of Development Control Functions in the 
English Planning System », in Aspects of Anglo-Canadian and Quebec Administrative Law, 
Travaux du laboratoire de recherche sur la justice administrative, Québec, Faculté de 
droit, Université Laval, March 1979, p. 362, 373-382. 
41. Quebec Code of Civil Procedure, art. 846. 
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Thus the Court has authorized the issuance of a writ of evocation41 against 
the Commission for refusal of giving the applicant a public hearing as 
required by section 44. The Court decided that the Commission was in 
breach of the audi alteram partem rule and had therefore lost the protection 
given by the privative clause of section 1742. Section 44 applies when the 
application is in respect with a lot situated in a reserved area. Once the 
agricultural zone has been decreed for a municipality the application is first 
submitted to the municipal corporation for a recommendation and then 
transmitted to the Commission. In such a case section 60 does not 
specifically require the Commission to hold a public hearing and there has 
yet to be a decision on whether, should an applicant so request, the 
Commission could refuse to give a hearing. It has however been submitted 
that because of section 23 of the Quebec Charter of Rights and Freedoms" 
such a refusal by the Commission would be equivalent to an excess of 
jurisdiction44. 
The exercise by the Commission of the power to review and revoke its 
own decisions or orders given by section 14 has been litigated in the courts 
especially since there is no right to appeal its decisions. In practice, it very 
often occurs that one of the members of the Commission who sat for the 
decision rendered on the original application for authorization is also sitting 
on the review panel45. As of now there have been four instances where the 
Superior Court has been requested to quash a decision of the Commission 
on that ground. In Gavardc. C.P.T.A.Q.46 justice Landry decided that such a 
practice did not warrant the issuance of a writ of evocation against the 
Commission since the power to review was to be distinguished from an 
appeal and since there was nothing in section 18 to infer that Parliament 
wanted to exclude from a review panel any member of the Commission47. 
But in three other instances48 the Superior Court took a more liberal 
approach emphasizing the quasi-judicial functions of the Commission and 
42. Benoit c. C.P.T.A.Q., CS. Trois-Rivières, n° 400-05-000599-812, Nov. 30, 1981, Lacour-
sière J. reported in L.A. CORMIER and L.V. SYLVESTRE, supra, note 38, pp. 557-559. 
43. R.S.Q., ch. C-12. 
44. J.M. LA VOIE et M. POIRIER, supra, note 23, p. 251. 
45. As a general rule, the Commission will sit in divisions composed of two members but a 
quorum of three members is needed when the Commission is sitting to review a decision. 
Sections 6 and 7. 
46. CS. Hull, n° 500-05-000594-831, July 4, 1983, Landry J., J.E. 83-741, reported in 
L.A. CORMIER and L.V. SYLVESTRE, supra, note 38, pp. 223-224. 
47. The Court relied on Commission des relations de travail du Québec c. Société d'administra-
tion et de fiducie, [1971] CA. 489. 
48. Les Équipements Mailloux Inc. c. C.P. T.A. Q., [1983] C.S. 26, an appeal from this decision 
was quashed by the Court of Appeal on January 13, 1984 on the ground that it was 
without object following a desistment by the applicant before the Commission ; Robert c. 
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the wide scope of the power of review which enables an applicant to submit 
representations and even request a hearing. In those cases, the judges 
expressed the view that such a situation reveals a reasonable apprehension of 
bias and can only be permitted when Parliament expresses such an intention 
which was not the case in the Act to Preserve Agricultural Land. 
« La Loi sur la protection du territoire agricole (sanctionnée le 22 décembre 78, 
avec effets rétroactifs au 9 novembre 78) n'autorise pas, dans ses termes, un 
cumul des fonctions à l'égard de la procédure en deux étapes qu'elle prévoit à 
l'égard de l'audition sur une demande et la révision de la décision prononcée 
sur icelle. 
Même si elle le prévoyait, pareille disposition autorisant un certain chevau-
chement ne devrait être appliquée que le moins souvent possible, tout 
organisme administratif exerçant des pouvoirs judiciaires ou quasi judiciaires 
ayant le devoir, non seulement d'être scrupuleusement équitable envers le 
justiciable, mais à la fois d'éloigner toute probabilité raisonnable de parti pris 
ou de préjugé. 
En l'espèce, l'un des commissaires a participé aux auditions des deux étapes 
prévues, a siégé aux deux étapes prévues et a signé les deux ordonnances, la 
seconde confirmant la première. En l'occurrence l'existence d'une crainte 
raisonnable justifiait, dans l'intérêt de la bonne administration de la justice, 
que le même commissaire évite de prendre part aux deux décisions de sorte que 
l'impartialité de la Commission ne puisse être mise en doute»4 ' 
A good example of the attitude of the Commission towards the courts 
and individual rights is the fact that the Commission relies on the Gavard 
case and the fact that the other cases are under appeal to justify maintaining 
its practice of letting members to sit in review of their decisions50. 
The power to issue cease and desist orders given the Commission by 
section 14 of the Act has given rise to situations which prompted the 
Superior Court to intervene in order to protect the rights of individuals. 
In a very recent instance51 an electronics technician had requested from 
the Commission an authorization under section 26 to erect a residence on a 
recently acquired tract of land. On its application form he had stated that he 
was a farmer explaining in a letter annexed to its application that, although 
C.P.T.A.Q., C.S.M., n° 500-05-008664-839, August 3, 1983, Barbeau J. reported in 
L.A.CORMIER and L.V. SYLVESTRE, supra, note 38, 217-219 (on appeal); Turmel c. 
C.P. T.A. Q., C.S.Q., n° 200-05-002491-830, September 26, 1983, J. Desmeules, reported in 
L.A. CORMIER and L.V. SYLVESTRE, supra, note 38, 219-222. 
49. Mr. J. Barbeau in Robert c. C.P.T.A.Q., note 48, p. 217. 
50. For instance in McA<?/M-Dona/d, C.P.T.A.Q., n° 3313D/60330, Feb. 3, 1984, pages 12-13 
(unreported). 
51. Dagenais c. C.P.T.A.Q., unreported, CS. St-François, No. 450-05-000738-837, March 27, 
1984, Toth J. 
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he worked as a technician, it was his intention to farm his land. In January 
1981 the Commission rendered a decision stating that it had no authorization 
to give because under section 40 of the Act a person whose principal 
occupation is agriculture can erect a residence on his lot without the 
authorization of the Commission. The Commission informed him that to 
avail himself of the privilege afforded by section 40 the applicant had to send 
a declaration to the Commission to the effect that his building project did 
not require the authorization of the Commission as foreseen by section 32. 
So did the applicant who then proceeded to build his residence. 
In January 1983, the applicant was summoned to appear before the 
Commission « to give testimony » as to his declaration under section 40. At 
that public hearing the applicant was interrogated both by the Commission 
and its attorney. On March 14, 1983 the Commission issued a cease and 
desist order in which it concluded that it had been clearly established that the 
applicant could not avail himself of section 40 and pretend to make 
agriculture his principal occupation in order to build his residence. It thus 
ordered the technician to cease any use other than agriculture and to remove 
the residence erected on the lot. 
The applicant then requested the Superior Court to issue a writ of 
evocation against the Commission. Mr. Justice Toth, in a carefully reasoned 
judgment, found a number of reasons to give relief to the applicant. First 
and foremost the Commission had not acted fairly toward him in leading 
him into error by its first decision and then trying to change it under the 
guise of a cease and desist order. Since the second decision had the effect of 
modifying the first one, this could not be done « proprio motu » by the 
Commission under section 18 but only upon request by an interested party. 
Mr. Justice Toth explained what should be the attitude of a body empowered 
to radically limit property rights such as the Commission : 
« Plus un organisme, tel l'intimée, a des pouvoirs étendus et plus par ses 
pouvoirs il peut limiter radicalement l'exercice d'un droit aussi fondamental 
que le droit de propriété, plus l'organisme doit agir avec circonspection et 
minutie pour demeurer strictement à l'intérieur de sa juridiction et dans la 
légalité et afin d'éviter de créer des situations telles que celles qui se présentent 
dans ce dossier. Si l'intimée s'est trompée en rendant sa première décision en ne 
la basant pas sur tous les motifs et sur tous les faits qu'elle aurait dû envisager, 
son erreur ne doit pas aboutir à une injustice pour le requérant. Le moins que 
l'on puisse dire c'est que par sa première décision l'intimée a induit le requérent 
en erreur »". 
Not only was the attitude of the Commission at fault but its procedures 
were also a gross violation of natural justice. In September 1982 the 
52. Dagenais c. C.P.T.A.Q., note 51, at p. 10. 
632 Les Cahiers de Droit (1984) 25 C.deD.617 
Commission held an « ex parte hearing» where evidence was presented in the 
absence of the applicant. The inquiry was then continued in January 1983 in 
a « public hearing » following which the order was issued against him. At this 
public hearing the applicant was summoned as a witness, not as a party, and 
was not informed of the evidence already presented in the « ex parte 
hearing », nor was he informed that a decision could be rendered against him 
or of his right to retain counsel and to bring forth any evidence. Failure to 
give him prior notice and an opportunity to rebut the allegations was a 
breach of natural justice. Finally, one member of the Commission parti-
cipated in the decision even if he did not sit during the first part of the 
hearing. 
In another case " a pensioner having retired on a farm invoked section 40 
to build a residence for each one of his three sons. Two years after the 
sending of his declaration to the Commission under section 32, the Com-
mission ordered him to demolish those residences on the ground that, being 
a pensioner, the petitioner's principal occupation could not be agriculture. 
On a petition to issue a writ of evocation, the Superior Court held that the 
Commission committed an error going to jurisdiction in its interpretation of 
section 40. The fact that petitioner's pension revenue exceeded his farming 
revenue was not the criteria of section 40. The land being cultivated by the 
petitioner was the essential requirement. But the Court went further and 
ruled that the attitude of the Commission was also sufficient ground to 
intervene. The Court held that it had abused its discretion in its adminis-
tration of the Act in waiting over two years after the petitioner's declaration 
of its intention to take advantage of section 40 before acting on such a 
declaration. Here again the judgment provides guidance as to what should 
be the proper standard of fairness in the exercise of the discretion provided 
by the statute : 
« Le principe de l'équitabilité dans la mise en application des lois est depuis 
longtemps reconnu en droit administratif canadien ; l'affaire Roncarelli [1958] 
R.C.S. 121, n'en a illustré qu'un aspect bien caractérisé. La discrétion inhérente 
à l'application d'une loi publique, d'un devoir au terme de celle-ci ou d'une 
initiative au cours de son exercice, doit toujours s'exercer dans une perspective 
donnée qui, de toute nécessité, se doit d'être empreinte de bonne foi, 
d'équitabilité, voire d'intégrité et d'impartialité. Il serait trop facile autrement 
de détourner l'intention exprimée par le législateur. 
Nous sommes en présence ici d'une commission administrative qui doit se 
comporter comme le ferait une cour de justice. Le devoir statutaire implicite de 
cette dernière lui dictait d'agir, dans les circonstances susrelatées dans un délai 
raisonnable afin d'éviter au requérant Robert de s'engager dans la voie qu'il 
avait signifiée à la commission plus de 2 ans auparavant »54. 
53. Robert c. C.P.T.A.Q., supra, note 48. 
54. W.,atp. 219. 
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Finally, there is at least one case in which the Superior Court has 
intervened in the very exercise of the discretion which the Act gives to the 
Commission when it decides on an application. In Turmelc. C.P.T.A.Q." the 
petitioners who wanted to buy a lot on which to build their residence had 
inquired about its agricultural zoning status prior to its acquisition. They 
were informed that the Commission had rendered a decision in which it had 
stated that the lot in question was protected under section 101 by virtue of 
acquired rights. Having bought the lot they were informed that in order to 
get the building permit they had to transmit to the Commission a declaration 
that an authorization was not required since the lot was protected under 
section 101. An information officer of the Commission even completed their 
declaration stating that the Commission had already recognized acquired 
rights on the lot. The petitioners then proceeded to build a residence valued 
at about 125,000$ before being notified by attorneys for the Commission 
that the house had been illegaly built. They tried in vain to obtain an 
authorization from the Commission and their request for a review was also 
dismissed by the Commission who finally ordered them to remove or 
demolish the residence. 
The Superior Court, on their motion, authorized the issuance of a writ 
of evocation against the decisions of the Commission. Among other grounds 
the Court held that the Commission had failed to exercise its jurisdiction in 
refusing to take into consideration the consequences that a refusal to grant 
an authorization would have on the applicants as mandated by section 62. 
This is to our knowledge the only case in which the Superior Court has 
exercised its supervisory control over the criteria of decision. Foremost in 
the Court 's willingness to intervene was its appraisal of the fairness of the 
applicant's position and its reliance on the representations of the Commission 
as evidenced by the following passage : 
« La bonne foi des requérants n'a aucunement été mise en doute et ceux-ci 
étaient en droit de se fier aux représentations ou renseignements émanant d'un 
représentant autorisé de la commission intimée. S'il s'avérait que ces rensei-
gnements étaient inexacts, il répugnerait au simple bon sens et à la plus 
élémentaire justice que les requérants aient maintenant à en supporter les 
conséquences »5é. 
These cases illustrate the very important role played by the courts in 
giving the individual a minimum of protection against the excesses of 
administrative discretion. They also reveal a frightful overtone of insensitivity 
and blind single-mindedness in planning policies against which judicial 
review is unfortunately the only resort. Therefore it is not surprising that the 
55. Supra, note 48. 
56. Id, at p. 222. 
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Superior Court is protecting its jurisdiction as against the Commission in 
order to facilitate access to judicial review. 
1.2.2. Protecting access to the courts 
A review of the cases decided under the Act to Preserve Agriculture Land 
shows a number of examples where the Superior Court has had to decide on 
the extent of its jurisdiction over matters dealt with in the Act. On the whole 
they reveal that the Court will tend to protect its jurisdiction and that this 
judicial policy is beneficial to individual and property rights. 
For instance, in Dagenais c. C.P.T.A.Q. where judicial review was 
requested against an order of the Commission under section 14, it was 
argued on behalf of the Commission that judicial review was premature since 
the Commission would have to obtain an order from the Court to insure 
compliance as foreseen in section 85. This argument was rejected. The Court 
held that an order of the Commission has in itself an element of finality since 
not complying with an order of the Commission constitutes per se an 
infraction under section 87(3)57. 
The role of the Court on an application for an order enjoining a person 
to comply with an order of the Commission as foreseen in section 85 provides 
another case in point. In early cases58 under that section it was argued by the 
Commission that on such an application the Superior Court had to assume 
that the Commission's order was well founded and had to take it in its 
entirety according to its tenor. The only question left to the Superior Court, 
it was submitted, was whether, on a factual basis, there was indeed a 
contravention to an order of the Commission. This interpretation was 
rejected by the Court who decided in favor of an extended jurisdiction 
enabling the Court to exercise its power of judicial review on such an 
application and enabling the respondent to invoke in his defence all grounds 
in fact or in law that he could have adduced against the order of the 
Commission, including the existence of acquired rights. 
The Superior Court has also decided that an application under section 
85 is premature if a request has been made to the Commission to revoke its 
order issued under section 1459 and that, on such an application, the onus to 
57. Dagenais c. C.P.T.A.Q., supra, note 51, at p. 14. Contra: C.P.T.A.Q. c. Martel, C.S. 
St-Hyacinthe, n° 750-05-0228-82, August 6, 1982, J.E. 82-906, reported in L.A. CORMIER 
and L.V. SYLVESTRE, supra, note 38, p. 749. 
58. C.P.T.A.Q. c. Meunier, C.S.Q., n° 200-05-003428-79, September 18, 1979, Moisan J., 
reported in L.A. CORMIER and L.V. SYLVESTRE, supra, note 38, 745-748; C.P.T.A.Q. c. 
Asselin, (1980) 14 M.P.L.R. 152(C.S.). 
59. C.P.T.A.Q. c. Dagenais, C.S.M., n° 500-05-007964-800, August 29, 1980, Aranovitch J. 
reported in L.A. CORMIER and L.V. SYLVESTRE, supra, note 38, 748. 
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prove a contravention to an order of the Commission rests upon the 
petitioner upon a preponderance of evidence test60. The Court cannot 
modify nor correct an order of the Commission under section 85 and thus, 
should the order be impossible of application, the motion for an order of the 
Superior Court under section 85 will be dismissed61. 
The same attitude is evident in the willingness of the Courts to allow 
property owners to gain access to the Superior Court on motions for 
declaratory judgments62 thus by-passing the Commission de protection du 
territoire agricole and having their rights under the Act declared by the 
courts. In Lefebvre c. C.P.T.A. Q.6\ Mr. Justice Nichols, then of the Superior 
Court, held that since according to section 101 acquired rights can be 
exercised without the authorization of the Commission, the owner of a tract 
of land protected by acquired rights could always come to the ordinary 
courts to have them recognized : 
« Celui qui prétend avoir des droits acquis n'a pas à s'adresser à la commission 
pour aliéner, lotir et utiliser à une fin autre que l'agriculture. Si la commission 
refuse de reconnaître les droits acquis qu'un tel propriétaire prétend avoir, ce 
dernier pourra toujours s'adresser aux tribunaux de droit commun pour les 
faire reconnaître parce que leur juridiction n'a pas été affectée par cette loi. La 
juridiction conférée à la commission vise le territoire qui, au sens de la loi, avait 
une vocation agricole le jour où la loi a pris effet, soit le 9 novembre 1978. Les 
lots auxquels la loi reconnaît des droits acquis aux articles 101 et s. continuent 
d'être soumis à la juridiction des tribunaux de droit commun. 
En s'adressant d'abord à la commission pour obtenir son autorisation, le 
requérant n'a pas renoncé à la juridiction des tribunaux de droit commun » " 
The fact that an application for authorization has been presented to the 
Commission does not prevent the applicant from coming to the Superior 
Court for a declaration of his rights65 and the motion for declaratory 
60. Aylmer (Ville) c. Entreprises R. Scholle Liée et al, unreported, CS . Hull, n° 500-05-
000727-837, September 23, 1983, Landry J. 
61. C.P.T.A.Q. c. Benard, CS. Richelieu, n° 765-05-000380-80, December 23, 1980. Deslandes 
J., J.E. 81-238, reported in L.A. CORMIER and L.V. SYLVESTRE, supra, note 38, p. 754-755. 
62. Code of Civil Procedure, section 453. 
63. Lefebvre c. C.P.T.A.Q., CS . Drummond, n° 405-05-000120-824, November 10, 1982. 
Nichols J., J.E. 82-1153, reported in L.A. CORMIER et L.V. SYLVESTRE, supra, note 38, 
873-878, confirmed by C.A.M., n° 500-09-000021-832, August 21, 1981, J.E. 84-720, leave 
to appeal refused by the Supreme Court on Dec. 5, 1984; see also: Morin c. C.P.T.A.Q., 
CS. Quebec, n° 200-05-001983-816, June 17, 1982, Gervais J., J.E. 83-711 reported 
in L.A. CORMIER and L.V. SYLVESTRE, supra, note 38, 894-900 (on appeal) ; Winzen Land 
Corp. Ltd. c. C.P.T.A.Q., [1981] CA. 383, 387. 
64. Lefebvre c. C.P.T.A.Q., note 63, at p. 876. 
65. Lefebvre c. C.P. TA. Q., supra, note 63, at. p. 876. 
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judgment is not affected by the privative clause of section 1766. This recourse 
has been allowed by the courts not only for declarations of acquired rights 
but also for declarations by the courts that an owner is entitled to build on 
his lot a residence in accordance with section 3167 that his lot does not fall 
under the jurisdiction of the Commission68 or that a particular transaction 
does not constitute an « alienation » as defined by the Act69. 
1.2.3. The protection of property rights 
The right to hold and enjoy private property free from any interference 
is also a right which the Superior Court will try to protect and preserve even 
in the face of such an invasion as that permitted by the Act to Preserve 
Agricultural Land. For instance the Court will readily adopt a restrictive 
interpretation of the statute that will limit the scope of the restrictions 
imposed on property rights70. On the other hand the Superior Court has had 
a much more liberal view of acquired rights as that of the Commission". 
This is especially important if one considers that free access to the courts to 
have such rights recognized enables the private owner to choose a forum 
where his rights will be better protected. This is true not only of the scope 
and extent of the definition of acquired rights under section 101 but also of 
the right to enlargement as given by section 103. Thus in a recent case, the 
Superior Court has held, contrary to the Commission's position, that, under 
section 103, the enlargement of acquired rights can be made on two parts of 
the same lot even if such parts are not contiguous72. In another case, the 
Court has granted protection against loss of acquired rights under section 102 
66. Gauthier c. C.P.T.A.Q., CS. St-François, n° 450-05-000762-837, October 25, 1983, 
Peloquin J., J.E. 83-1081, reported in L.A. CORMIER and L.V. SYLVESTRE, supra, note 38, 
500-503. 
67. Idem. 
68. Villiardc. C.P.T.A.Q., [1982] CS. 380. 
69. Ouellet c. C.P.T.A.Q., C.S.Q., n° 200-05-00747-803, July 11, 1980, Laflamme J., reported 
in L.A. CORMIER and L.V. SYLVESTRE, supra, note 38, 365-369, rvd by C.A.Q., n° 200-09-
000463-809, April 6, 1983, J.E. 83-459, reported in L.A. CORMIER and L.V. SYLVESTRE, 
supra, 369-371. 
70. Lefebvrec. C.P.T.A.Q., supra, at p. 876; Morin c. C.P.T.A.Q.. supra, at p. 900 ; Robert c. 
C.P.T.A.Q.. supra, at p. 218. 
71. Louis V. SYLVESTRL, « Interprétation des droits acquis par la Commission de protection 
du territoire agricole du Québec », [1982] Justice municipale, 111-150 ; see also, C.P. T. A. Q. 
c. Lefebvre, on appeal, supra, note 63. 
72. Mondorc. C.P.T.A.Q., unreported, CS. Joliette, n° 705-05-000518-830, December 6, 1983, 
Tannenbaum J. (on appeal). 
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by deciding that the delay foreseen by that section does not apply when a 
person is before the courts73. 
In other cases interpretations given by the courts have had the result of 
reducing the scope of the prohibitions or of granting immunities from their 
application. In Villiardc. C.P.T.A.Q.74 Mr. Justice Biron held that properties 
held by the Federal Government or its agencies in Quebec were not subject 
to the Act. In Boissonneault c. Varennes15 the same judge interpreted the 
definition of a « sugar bush »76 as requiring that there be enough maple trees 
to justify production with the necessary equipment, thus reducing the scope 
of section 27 of the Act. 
But relying on judicial review alone is not sufficient to control the 
Commission de protection du territoire agricole and insure a satisfactory 
protection against undue invasion of individual and property rights. Judicial 
review is limited to questions of jurisdiction and cannot result in the granting 
of an authorization by the courts. One of the reasons why frustrated 
applicants do not use judicial review is that, even if successful, they will 
ultimately be back again before the Commission. For this reason, the 
absence of a right of appeal is, in our opinion, a very serious defect of the Act 
and should be corrected along the lines of the British model of an 
administrative appeal followed by an appeal to the courts on questions of 
law and jurisdiction. 
Limiting the extent of discretion conferred to the Commission should 
also be a priority. After over six years and more than 50,000 individual 
decisions, the Commission should be required to determine by regulation 
some of its policies in order to reduce the number of cases decided by 
administrative discretion and give a minimum of certainty to applicants. 
While adopting administrative discretion as the basis of agricultural land 
preservation in the name of efficiency, our legislators have failed to adopt 
the guarantees which should accompany the granting of discretionary 
powers to give the individual a modicum of protection against arbitrariness. 
It is comforting to notice that the courts are increasingly using judicial review 
to correct some of the abuses and excesses resulting from such a lack of 
guarantees. 
73. Rheaume c. C.P.T.A.Q., C.S.Q., n° 200-05-002006-802, July 2, 1981, Masson J., reported 
in L.A. CORMIER and L.V. SYLVESTRE, supra, note 38, at pp. 868-873 and on other 
grounds ; C.A.Q., n° 200-09-000563-814, June 11, 1984, J.E. 84-551. 
74. Supra, note 68. 
75. Boissonneault c. Varennes, CS. Richelieu, n° 765-05-000358-79, June 16, 1981, Biron J., 
J.E. 81-753, reported in L.A. CORMIER and L.V. SYLVESTRE, supra, note 38, 778-785, 
conf. : C.A.M., n° 500-09-000-996-819, Oct. 19, 1984. 
76. « A stand of trees suitable for the cultivation of maple sugar » Sect. 1(7). 
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2. Judicial review over local governments 
As noted at the very outset, the supervisory power of the Superior Court 
has always been an essential part of Quebec and indeed Canadian Municipal 
Law. In recent years however there have been tremendous developments in 
local planning law especially with the coming into force in 1979 of the Land 
Use Planning and Development Act11. Recent years have also witnessed 
increased recourse to the supervisory power of the Superior Court over local 
planning policies and practices. The Courts have been active and the judicial 
developments have been as spectacular as the legislative developments 
although they have often taken the form of traditional judicial review of 
regulations. 
In order to better understand the scope and trends of the courts' 
intervention over local planning we shall first determine the principal 
characteristics of local planning. Such characteristics can be best identified 
when contrasted with those of the Act to Preserve Agricultural Land. 
In 1979, after the coming into force of the Agricultural Land Protection 
Act, a new planning act was adopted for Quebec. Announced as the main 
element of a government policy of decentralization, the Land Use Planning 
and Development Actn fostered the setting up of regional county 
municipalities comprising urban and rural local municipalities which send 
representatives to sit on the council of the regional county municipality. 
That regional council is required by law to prepare and adopt a development 
plan that must include the general aims of land development policy and the 
general policies on land use for the territory of the regional county 
municipalitie79. In turn, after the coming into force of the regional 
development plan, each local municipality must adopt for its own territory a 
local planning programme, a zoning by-law, a subdivision by-law and a 
building by-law. The local planning programme and by-laws must be in 
conformity with the objectives of the regional development plan80. 
The coming into force of the Land Use Planning and Development Act 
has not brought about any modification to the Agricultural Land Protection 
Act and thus, while regional councils in theory are responsible for land use 
planning policies over their territories, in practice, the delimitation of 
agricultural zones81 and, thus, the definition of urban perimeters are left in 
77. R.S.Q., ch. A-19.1. 
78. Id. 
79. Section 5. 
80. Sections 33 and 34. 
81. Even if, officially, there has been a memorandum of agreement over the agricultural zone 
decree between the Commission de protection du territoire agricole and the municipalities 
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the hands of the Commission de protection du territoire agricole. The 
Commission's control is absolute over all the lands in the agricultural zone 
because, according to section 98 of the Act to Preserve Agricultural Land, that 
Act prevails over any inconsistent provision of any statute applicable to a 
municipal corporation and it also prevails over any provision of a land use 
and development plan, a master plan or a zoning, subdivision or construction 
by-law. Thus, the regional development plan is placed in a straightjacket and 
the decision-making power of the regional council is eroded. 
The distance between the two statutes and their policies becomes even 
greater following a quick comparison. The philosophy behind the Planning 
Act is that the planning function must be in the hands of local or regional 
authorities composed of elected officials. The philosophy behind the Agri-
cultural Land Protection Act is that the preservation of farmland is an 
objective of far too great an importance to be left in the hands of locally 
elected officials who cannot be trusted82. Secondly, the Act to Preserve 
Agricultural Land creates a regime of control with a single objective in mind : 
that of farmland protection. This regime centralizes all powers in the hands 
of a provincial board whose members are appointed and not responsible to 
the electorate. On the other hand, the Land Use Planning and Development 
Act is a general act which does not give precedence to any land-use policy but 
simply sets out the rules of the planning process while leaving to locally 
elected officials the choice of content of such policies. Thirdly, the Agri-
cultural Land Protection Act is based on the principle of administrative 
discretion by which a centralized Commission deals with applications on a 
case by case basis by applying any or all of a set of general criteria mentioned 
in the Act. In the Land Use Planning and Development Act, all land-use 
policies are to be set out in by-laws so that the officer responsible for the 
issuance of permits has no discretion but simply verifies if the application is 
in conformity with the provisions of the by-law83. 
There we have the main characteristics of local planning. The plan itself 
does not directly and legally affect the rights of any property owner, this is 
done by the by-laws or regulations which implement the plan or the planning 
in 92% of the cases {Agricultural Land Protection Act, sects. 47-53) in practice, since the 
Commission had the last word in any case (section 48) it in fact imposed its will over a 
great number of municipalities. Michel POIRIER, « Observations sur les lois de l'aména-
gement », in Bilan des lois sur l'aménagement. Compte rendu de la journée d'étude tenue le 
16 octobre 1981 à Magog, Sherbrooke, Association québécoise d'urbanisme et Urbanitek, 
1982, p. 49. 
82. Document de consultation sur la protection du territoire agricole québécois, Gouvernement 
du Québec, ministère de l'Agriculture, 7 juillet 1978, pp. 29-30. 
83. Land Use Planning and Development Act, supra, note 77, sections 113-122. 
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programme84. The system is thus regulatory and does not rest on admi-
nistrative discretion but on compliance with the by-law. This is what 
distinguishes local planning from development control : 
« The main difference between the two (development control and zoning) is 
that with development control an administrative official determines whether or 
not the proposed use of the land is satisfactory on the merits of each individual 
application. When the land is zoned the owner need only comply with the 
zoning by-laws and he may use the land in accordance with the zoning »85. 
There are three main regulatory controls in Quebec local planning. The 
subdivision by-law regulates the subdivision of land into lots and determines 
their area and dimensions, the laying of streets and the provision of 
parkland86 while the building by-law is concerned with the quality of 
materials used in a building and the manner of their assembly for security 
and salubrity purposes87. The zoning by-law, probably the best known 
planning tool in North America, regulates the use of land. Its name derives 
from the division of the municipality in zones or districts for the purposes of 
uniform regulation of the use of land and building within each zone88. Even 
if such matters as height, spacing, parking facilities, access, etc. can be 
regulated in the zoning by-law, its essential object is the regulation of the use 
of land and all other elements are in fact ancillary to the use or uses 
permitted in a given zone. 
These controls are administrated by way of a permit system89. The 
issuance of a permit is entrusted to a local official whose duty it is to verify 
whether a permit application complies with the by-law90. If a permit 
application complying with the provisions of the by-law is refused by the 
officer, the owner can compel its issuance by the courts " . On the other hand, 
84. Campbell c. City of Regina, (1967) 63 D.L.R. (2d) 188 (Sask. C.A.) ; Subilomar Properties 
(Dundas) Ltd. c. Cloverdale Shopping Center, [1973] R.C.S. 596; Salvas c. Tracy, [1966] 
R.L. 513 ; Rogers c. District of Saanich, (1983) 22 M.P.L.R. 1 (B.C.S.C); J. L'HEUREUX, 
« Schémas d'aménagement et plans d'urbanisme en vertu de la Loi sur l'aménagement et 
l'urbanisme », (1980) 11 Revue générale de droit, 7, 51-56. 
85. Moir J. in Tegon Developments Ltd. c. Edmonton, (1977) 81 D.L.R. (3d) 543, 5 Alta L.R. 
(2d) 63 (Alta C.A.) affd (1979) 1 R.C.S. 98 ; see, also, P. KENNIFF, « Development Control 
in Canada : Evolution and Prospects», (1974) J.P.E.L 385, 388-389. 
86. Land Use Planning and Development Act. supra, note 77, (hereinafter cited L.U.P.D.A.), 
section 115. 
87. L.U.P.D.A., section 118. 
88. L.U.P.D.A., section 113(1) and (3): P. KENNIFF, supra, note 85, p. 387. 
89. L.U.P.D.A., sections 119-122. 
90. Id., sections 120-121. 
91. Hull c. J.G. Bisson Construction and Engineering, [1964] B.R. 148. 
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a permit issued by the administrative officer is of no avail if the use of the 
building is in contravention of the by-law92. 
2.1. Judicial control over the manner of exercising local planning powers 
As can be inferred, one of the main features of the local planning system 
in Quebec and, indeed, in most of Canada, is to provide the landowner with 
a good measure of certainty about how he should govern himself according 
to the regulations. The fact that the officer whose duty it is to administer the 
by-law has no discretion in deciding whether a permit should issue enables 
the landowner to know in advance his rights and obligations under the 
planning regulations. The courts have been very effective in preserving this 
feature of the local planning system. 
This is the essence of the manner of exercising the power to zone and the 
courts have always seen to it that such power remains at the regulatory level 
and not at the administrative level. Thus a municipal council cannot, under 
the guise of a by-law, try to give itself an absolute discretion to decide each 
permit application on its merits without laying down any principle governing 
the manner of exercise of this discretion. The municipal council when 
adopting the zoning by-law must « specify, for each zone, the structures and 
uses that are authorized and those that are prohibited »" and the conditions 
according to which a use or a structure will be permitted in a given zone. The 
courts will tend to reduce the margin of discretion that the council will try to 
grant to itself in deciding to classify and allocate land uses within the 
municipality. They will do so by declaring ultra-vires, as an illegal exercise of 
the power to adopt by-laws, the allocation of discretionery powers in a local 
planning regulations such as the zoning by-law. 
Therefore, it has been held that the municipal council cannot in its 
by-law leave to itself the authorization to put a lot to a specific use or its 
location94 nor can it try to do the same thing indirectly by way of a 
discretionary exception to a prohibition of certain uses in a zone or over the 
whole of its territory95. They have also invalidated enactments in by-laws 
authorizing council to give a derogation to a specific regulation in the zoning 
by-law such as height regulations96. 
92. Mountain Place and Valet Shop Ltd. c. Montréal, [1971] CA. 815, 818-819; Le Moine c. 
Notre-Dame-du-Portage, [1974] CS. 46, 51. 
93. L.U.P.D.A., section 113(3). 
94. City of Verdun c. Sun Oil Co., [1952] 1 R.C.S. 222, conf. [1950] B.R. 320. 
95. City of Outremont c. Protestant School Trustees for the Municipality of Outremont, [ 1952] 2 
R.C.S. 506, conf. [1951] B.R. 676. 
96. Ville St-Laurent c. Marien, [1953] B.R. 792 ; Ville deKamouraska c. Bossé, unreported, CS. 
Kamouraska, n° 250-05-000287-79, June 26, 1980, Jacques J. 
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As recently stated by the Supreme Court of Canada the principle that a 
regulatory power cannot be transformed into an administrative discretion 
provides certainty for the landowners and developers and should be 
respected even when the municipal council is faced with complex planning 
problems. Failure to provide this element of certainty and predictability in 
the local planning system will warrant judicial intervention " . 
It has been written that « the test of uncertainty is uncertain » as a 
motive to pronounce by-laws invalid98. Still, the Quebec courts have used it 
of late to exercise judicial control over planning regulations and provide 
relief to individuals that would otherwise fall under questionable provisions. 
For a long time the test of uncertainty had not been used by Courts in 
Quebec while it was a more familiar occurrence in the rest of Canada". But 
the decision of the Court of Appeal in Cie Miron Ltée c. La Reine 10° has had 
the effect of making the Courts more familiar with the test of uncertainty 
and has given rise to more successful attacks on by-laws. In that case a 
majority of the Court of Appeal quashed a conviction for violation of 
provisions of the air pollution by-law of the Montreal Urban Community 
whose terms were couched in such broad language 101 that it was not possible 
for citizens to know what were their duties and obligations under the 
regulation. The Court held those provisions to be void on the ground of 
vagueness and stated that the tendency to enact general and abstract laws 
and by-laws, leaving it to the Courts to define the extent of their application, 
should be avoided. 
Since then, have been declared void for such defect, provisions of a 
zoning by-law which are drafted in terms so general and so vague as to leave 
to the local planning officer complete discretion to decide whether a 
residential building should be allowed in the municipality 102. In an Ontario 
case 10\ the municipality purported to amend its general zoning by-law 
creating a new use category, seasonal residential, which provided that certain 
97. Canadian Institute of Public Real Estate Companies c. Toronto, [1979] 2 R.C.S. 2; 7 
M.P.L.R. 39. 
98. De Smith's Judicial Review of Administrative Action, 4,h ed. by J.M. Evans, London, 
Stevens, 1980,355. 
99. P.A. CÔTÉ, « Le règlement municipal indéterminé», (1973) 33 R. du B. HA. 
100. [1979] CA. 36, 7 M.P.L.R. 28. 
101. <• Il est interdit de répandre dans l'atmosphère de quelque source que ce soit, volontai-
rement ou non, des matières qui polluent l'atmosphère et portent atteinte à la vie, la 
sécurité, à la santé, à la propriété ou au confort du public, ou qui entravent l'exercice ou la 
jouissance de droits communs ». 
102. Descheneaux c. St-Jean-Baptisle-de-Nicolet, CS. Trois-Rivières, n° 400-05-000104-82, 
October 10, 1982, Lacoursière J., J.E. 82-1094. 
103. Mueller c. Township of Tiny, (1976) 1 M.P.L.R. 1 (Ont. H.C, Garret J.). 
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lands could only be used by a person who maintained and regularly resided 
in a permanent dwelling in another location. Said the Court : 
« By-law 33-73 is void for uncertainty in that the most important part of the 
same is not fairly and readily understandable. The question is asked what is the 
meaning of the words "who maintains and regularly resides in a permanent 
dwelling in another location". Do they operate to prohibit married women 
who do not work for a salary and maintain a permanent dwelling at another 
location from using lands in an area affected by this by-law? Do they similarly 
prohibit university students who live at home and make no contribution to a 
permanent dwelling, people who travel extensively, people who live in boarding 
houses and rented rooms and who move frequently and many other persons of 
this kind? It is clear that if the words "maintain" and "permanent dwelling" 
are given their plain meaning, they could operate to prohibit the use of lands to 
which this by-law is made applicable by a fairly significant percentage of the 
population»104. 
In a very recent case 105 the Court of Appeal, relying on its earlier 
precedent in Miron, came to the same conclusion about a provision of a 
zoning by-law purporting to classify industrial uses according to their 
environmental impact on neighbouring uses. The by-law put in the same 
class all establishments conforming to the following provisions : 
« Ces établissements ne comportent pas de risques d'incendie et/ou d'explosion, 
ni d'inconvénients pour le voisinage par la fumée, les poussières, le bruit ou 
tous autres facteurs semblables ». 
The Court simply said that it was too vague to constitute valid 
regulation. 
It is to be noted that the test of uncertainty has been used as a motive for 
judicial control over by-laws in areas other than zoning and environmental 
protection. In Cormier c. Lasalle 106 a by-law prohibiting the keeping of more 
than three cats in a dwelling or its outbuildings was declared invalid because 
the expression « in a dwelling or its outbuildings » was vague, imprecise and 
promoted an arbitrary application more so since it did not indicate with 
sufficient precision who had a duty and was liable under the by-law. In 
Desbiens c. Rimouski107 a by-law purporting to regulate chimney sweeping 
was also invalidated on the grounds that its drafting left to the municipal 
council discretion to grant licences to whom it wanted without determining 
any criteria. 
104. Mueller c. Township of Tiny, note 103, p. 4. 
105. Les Entreprises B.C.P. Liée c. Bourassa et ai, unreported, C.A.M., n° 500-09-000995-84, 
February 27, 1984, J.E. 84-279. 
106. (1982) 20 M.P.L.R. 185 (Que. S.C.). 
107. CS. Rimouski, n° 100-05-000517-81, January 26, 1983, Larue J., J.E. 83-236. 
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2.2. Protection against invasion of privacy and abuse of planning powers 
The revival by the Supreme Court of Canada of the doctrine of 
unreasonableness permitting the declaration of invalidity of municipal by-
laws has given a new weapon to the Courts in their fight against abuse of 
powers in the planning field. In Bell c. Regina 108 the Court was asked to 
quash a conviction resulting from an alleged violation of a municipal zoning 
by-law adopted by the Ontario Borough of North York. The by-law limited 
the uses of certain residential zones to « dwellings, semi-detached dwellings 
and duplex dwellings » as defined in the by-law. « Dwelling unit » was 
defined as a separate set of living quarters designed or intended for use by an 
individual or one family alone and « Family » was defined as a group of two 
or more persons living together and interrelated by bonds of consanguinity, 
marriage or legal adoption occupying a dwelling unit. The appellant, the 
tenant of a detached duplex whose costs he shared with two other persons 
unrelated to him, was convicted for a violation of the by-law. Appellant's 
argument that the by-law was unreasonable was accepted by the Supreme 
Court even if such a doctrine was thought to be almost extinct. The Court 
said that, even as limited, the doctrine still existed in the case of by-laws found 
to be partial and unequal in their operation as between different classes, found 
to be manifestly unjust or disclosing bad faith or involving such oppressive 
or gratuitous interference with the rights of those subject to them as could 
find no justification in the minds of reasonable men 109. In view of the many 
possible inequitable applications of the definition of « family », the by-law in 
its device of adopting « family » as being the only permitted occupants of a 
self-contained dwelling came exactly within Lord Russel's words as being 
« such oppressive or gratuitous interference with the rights of those subject 
to them as could find no justification in the minds of reasonable men» and 
thus unreasonable. 
Surprisingly enough the Court could probably have achieved the same 
result of declaring void that provision of the zoning by-law without having 
to invoke the doctrine of unreasonableness simply because the power to zone 
by reference to the personal relationship of occupants rather than the use of 
the building is not a power that was granted the municipality and is therefore 
ultra-vires. As was said by Brooke J. in the Ontario Court of Appeal : 
« This is land zoning by people zoning and is not within the scope of the 
Planning Act»110. 
108. [1979] 2 S.C.R. 212. 
109. Spence J. at [1979] 2 S.C.R. 212, 222 citing Lord Russell in Kruse c. Johnson, (1898) 2 Q.B. 
91. 
110. (1977) 150 R. 2d 425 cited by Spence J. at [1979] 2 S.C.R. 212,221. 
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Still, the revival of the doctrine has encouraged courts to use it in the 
exercise of their supervisory power of local governments' planning regulations 
and the Bell case has also led them to intervene when the allocation of uses in 
zoning by-laws is dependent on personal characteristics rather than planning 
imperatives. In Gauthier c. Canton de Brompton ' " , Mr. Justice Gervais of 
the Superior Court declared void provisions of a zoning by-law which 
prohibited mobile homes in a particular district except for farmers, their 
employees or sons : 
« Une étude des articles 3 et 4 du règlement 239 révèle que le but dudit 
règlement, tout en étant justifié, interdit l'aménagement de maisons mobiles à 
certaines personnes et non à certains territoires ou parties de territoire. 
Il s'infère qu'un fermier pourrait aménager une maison mobile pour son fils 
mais qu'une personne occupant d'autres fonctions, soit un homme d'affaires, 
un professionnel, un professeur ou autres, ne pourrait le faire. 
Pour en arriver au but recherché, la municipalité aurait dû imposer des 
restrictions en se basant sur des superficies de terrain et non sur la nature des 
occupations du propriétaire ou du locataire d'une ferme. 
J'en conclus donc que le règlement, tel que rédigé, est discriminatoire et doit 
être annulé»"2 . 
The same result was obtained in Goudreau c. Laval " 3 where in a 
particular zone, the by-law permitted homes for senior citizens when 
managed by a public body or non-profit corporation while, in the case of 
corporation for profit, there was the additional requirement of a minimum 
of 100 units. Such additional requirement was annulled by the Court. 
Finally in Boissonneault c. Varennes114 the test of reasonableness was 
applied with respect to the validity of provisions in a zoning by-law 
prescribing uses permitted in a particular zone. The petitioner was a 
landowner whose intention it was to erect a residence and building for the 
raising of mink on her property. Her permit application was refused since 
the only permitted uses were those compatible with forestry conservation 
such as public recreation and the cultivation of maple sugar. The land being 
also under the jurisdiction of the Commission de protection du territoire 
agricole du Québec, Mr. Justice Biron evaluated the actual uses to which the 
land could be put by bringing together the provisions of both the municipal 
zoning by-law and the Act to Preserve Agricultural Land "5. On the one hand 
uses allowed under the by-law were not permitted under the Act without an 
111. CS. St-François, n° 450-05-001294-76, June 29, 1979, Gervais J., J.E. 79-768. 
112. Idem, pp. 3-4. 
113. C.S.M., n° 500-05-015640-830, February 1, 1984, Brossard J., J.E. 84-267. 
114. Supra, note 75. 
115. Supra, note 3. 
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authorization from the Commission " 6 while, on the other hand, cultivation 
of maple sugar, the only use permitted under both the by-law and the Act 
was not possible in fact because of an insufficient number of maple trees. 
Thus, the growing of trees being the only use she could make of her land, the 
by-law was held to be unreasonable in depriving her of a meaningful use of 
her property. 
The willingness of the Courts to test the reasonableness of zoning by-
laws has permitted them, as we have seen, to question the legality of local 
land-use policies based on grounds which are tantamount to an invasion of 
privacy or which constitute undue interference with the liberty of the subject. 
But their intervention is not confined to questions of validity and they also 
see to it that local governments do not abuse their powers with respect to 
administration. 
The classic example of such judicial attitude is revealed when a 
municipal corporation tries to illegally obtain concessions from permit 
applicants. The Courts have consistently held that a municipal corporation 
cannot impose as a prerequisite to the issuance of a subdivision or building 
permit, conditions that are not required by statute or valid regulation "7. 
They have even decided that an individual is not bound to respect an 
agreement that the municipality forces him to enter into as a condition 
precedent for the issuance of a permit if the agreement purports to impose 
charges or requirements exceeding those provided for in the by-laws"8. 
What the courts are here offering is protection against planning blackmail. 
2.3. The courts and the allocation of uses 
These last developments will be devoted to situations where the courts 
will be asked to intervene into decisions made by council about planning 
policies in order to rectify substantive defects and to defeat council's will as 
expressed in its by-laws. 
In the first situation a landowner submits a permit application in 
conformity with the existing zoning by-law to realise a permitted development 
and council, before the issuance of the permit, changes the by-law or causes a 
116. A possible authorization by the Commission for a use permitted under the by-law was said 
to be too problematical to warrant consideration. 
117. Etobicoke Board of Education c. Highbury Developments Ltd., [1958] S.C.R. 196; flu Lac 
Development c. Boucherville, [1959] R.L. 484; Landreville c. Boucherville, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 
801, 810; Lambert-Bédard c. Sillery, (1980) 13 M.P.L.R. 307 (Que. CS.). 
118. Village de Gracefield c. Bériault, [1979] R.P. 279 (CS.). 
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notice of motion to be given u 9 with the consequence that the use which was 
permitted so far becomes prohibited under the new by-law therefore 
precluding the issuance of the permit. 
For a long time, Canadian and Quebec case law was to the effect that, in 
such a situation, the rights of the parties in presence, the landowner and the 
municipal corporation, had to be decided as of the date of the issuance of a 
writ of mandamus when the matter came to court on the petition of the 
landowner to force the issuance of the permit. In practice, unless the 
landowner were to take proceedings in mandamus at the same time he 
submitted his permit application, this meant that the municipal authorities 
could defeat its application at will : 
« The race would seem to be to the swift in these matters, and the goal is not 
reached merely when the application for the permit is made, or even when the 
proceedings are launched, but only when the matter comes to be dealt with by 
the Court. So that the passing of an effective by-law by the council before the 
Court has adjudicated has the effect, as I understand the judgment of the 
Judicial Committee, of defeating the applicant in the exercise of what but for 
the by-law, would be his right to erect upon his land such buildings as the law 
as then permitted»120. 
This situation could be very frustrating for the landowner who only 
wanted to use his property according to the by-law especially so if the 
rezoning by council in order to defeat the permit application was not based 
on planning principles but on neighbour pressure or political clamouring as 
was often the case. 
In 1965, the Supreme Court in the Boyd Builders Case m tackled the 
problem in a case arising in Ontario and came out with a test to be applied in 
such a situation : 
« An owner has a prima facie right to utilize his own property in whatever 
manner he sees fit subject only to the rights of surrounding owners, e.g. 
nuisance, etc. This prima facie right may be defeated or superseded by rezoning 
if three prerequisites are established by the municipality, a) a clear intent to 
restrict or zone existing before the application by the owner for a building 
permit, b) that council has proceeded with good faith and c) that council has 
proceeded with dispatch»122. 
119. L.V.P.D.A. section 114 «when a notice of motion has been given to amend a zoning 
by-law, no building plan may be approved nor may any permit or certificate be granted for 
the carrying out of works or use of an immoveable which, if the amending by-law is 
adopted, will be prohibited in the zone concerned». 
120. Orde J. in Re Upper Canada Estates & MacNicol, (1931) 4 D.L.R. 459, at p. 462 ; Spiers c. 
Toronto Township, (1956) 4 D.L.R. (2d) 330, 335-336 ; Frank c. Laurin, (1978) 13 M.P.L.R. 
94 (Que. S.C.) and cases cited therein. 
121. City of Ottawa c. Boyd Builders Ltd., [1965] S.C.R. 408. 
122. Spence J., note 121, at 410. 
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The Court also decided that, in such a situation, the rights of the parties 
are to be determined as of the date of the filing of the landowner's 
application for a permit and the onus of establishing good faith is on the 
municipality. 
After a very long wait, one of the most important developments in the 
area of zoning has been the application, by the Quebec Courts, of the 
judgment of the Supreme Court in Boyd Builders. In Mirabel c. Carrières 
T.R.P. Ltée m the respondent company obtained approval in principle from 
the competent provincial agencies as well as from the appellant municipality 
to establish a quarry in the town. Following protests by a group of citizens 
the municipality adopted two by-laws in order to amend the existing zoning 
by-law so as to forbid the establishment of the quarry in question. The 
Superior Court maintained a motion for a writ of mandamus from the 
company and its judgment was upheld in appeal. The Court of Appeal 
applied the test given by the Supreme Court in Boyd Builders and held the 
town did not act in good faith in rezoning the property following the 
application for a permit, nor did it have a prior intention to rezone before 
such application. Since then there have been at least two instances where 
Quebec courts have followed the Boyd Builders Case. In Belœil c Guy 124, the 
Superior Court held, on the basis of Boyd Builders, that the giving of a notice 
of motion in council to prevent the issuance of a permit pending the 
adoption of an amendment which would prohibit the erection of the 
intended building, did not operate on an application for a permit made 
before the giving of such a notice of motion. Before such filing there was no 
intention of changing the zoning by-law and the amendment had been 
prepared following neighbour complaints. In Amireault c. Paroisse de 
l'Epiphanie ni the same problem arose in conjunction with an application for 
a building permit for a pig farm and the Superior Court said that in bowing 
to political pressure based on the fear of pollution the municipal council did 
not act in good faith towards the applicant in amending its zoning by-law 
therefore making it impossible to erect the pig farm. The Court applied the 
criteria established in Boyd Builders and issued the injunction requested by 
the applicant. The Court of Appeal affirmed126. 
These judicial developments show the concern of the Courts to establish 
an equilibrium between the rights of a landowner and the legitimate interests 
123. (1979) 12 M.P.L.R. 104 (Que. C.A.), leave to appeal refused : [1980] 1 S.C.R. X ; for a 
commentary: J. L'HEUREUX, «De l'octroi du permis de construire», (1980) 40 R. du B. 
512. 
124. (1979) 9 M.P.L.R. 44 (Que. S.C.). 
125. (1980) 13 M.P.L.R. 213 (Que. S.C.). 
126. C.A.M., n° 500-09-000992-800, September 16, 1983. 
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of the municipal collectivity. The Boyd Builders test, as we have seen, decides 
the rights of the parties according to substantive standards, that of a prior 
committment to rezone and that of the equities in presence. Even if, in a 
given case, the test may result in the political will being defeated, the 
statement of Spence in Boyd Builders is less conducive to abuse on the part of 
municipal authorities than the old « race to the swift » test. 
One of the most difficult issues to be resolved by courts in local 
planning is when they are requested to decide whether a planning policy or 
decision is in the public interest. In Canada, the Supreme Court has clearly 
affirmed that it is the function of the courts to pass upon the question of 
public interest127 but such control being at the frontier of questions of 
opportunity it is exercised with great restraint by the Quebec courts. A 
typical situation would be that in which an amendment to a zoning by-law 
affecting only a small area, for instance one lot, has the effect of providing an 
economic or other advantage to one property owner while imposing 
inconvenience in the form of reduced amenities, noise, increase traffic and 
pollution to neighbouring landowners. In some instances they can take to 
the courts and request that such by-law or amendment be declared void 
because it was not adopted in the public interest but only to further private 
interests. The judge is then called upon to weigh the advantages of a 
planning decision which results in a windfall to one landowner as against the 
inconvenience caused to his neighbours. If there is no public interest motive 
justifying the prejudice caused, the by-law can be annulled. 
Such an example occurred in the case of Aube c. Loretteville 128. In this 
case, the disputed by-law was an amendment to the zoning by-law adopted 
to legalize the situation of a landowner who had erected a private garage 
inside the side-yard normally required to be free from any building. The 
general zoning by-law required a 7 foot side-yard but the garage had been 
erected at a distance of only two feet from the lot line. The amending by-law 
under attack specifically purported to authorize the existence of the garage. 
The neighbor who felt aggrieved by such a structure being too near his 
property asked the Superior Court to declare such amending by-law null and 
void for the motive that its adoption had been motivated by private interest. 
The town of Loretteville argued in defense that the amendment had 
been adopted in the public interest. Specifically, it argued that in allowing 
the construction of the garage, the amendment permitted the demolition of a 
number of old sheds and that therefore the public in general and even 
plaintiff benefitted from an improvement of the site. 
127. Kuchma c. Rural Municipality of Taché, [1945] S.C.R. 234. 
128. [1981] Justice municipale 132 (CS.). 
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Mr. Justice Moisan of the Superior Court rejected the town's argument. 
For one thing, the landowner in whose favor the amendment had been 
adopted had enough available land to build in accordance with the 
requirements of the zoning by-law and furthermore, the town could use 
other legal means to bring about the removal of the old sheds without letting 
the neighbouring landowner support by himself the inconvenience caused by 
the amending by-law. The amending by-law was held to be void because the 
Court found that there was no public interest warranting the prejudice 
caused to the neighbouring landowner. 
But even if an amendment benefits one individual and causes inconve-
nience to some other citizens, this can be justified in the public interest. For 
instance, in Bider c. Baie d'Urfé129, thirteen residents of Baie d'Urfé sought 
the quashing of an amending by-law purporting to rezone two lots to permit 
the construction of a medical-dental building arguing that the by-law was 
discriminatory and had not been adopted in the public interest but was based 
on the private interest of the owner of the site. According to them the 
amendment would have the effect of creating more vehicular traffic thereby 
increasing safety hazards, would detrimentally affect their view and the 
character of their neighbourhood and decrease their property values. The 
Court, in rejecting the application to quash, pointed out that the amending 
by-laws imposed conditions to minimize the negative impact of the new 
building on its environment and that there were already other commercial 
uses intruding in this residential neighbourhood. Finally the Court disposed 
of the petitioners argument that the by-law had not been adopted in the 
public interest : 
« While Petitioners, through their evidence, established their private interest in 
that their "tidy community" would be affected, the public interest was 
demonstrated by the need in Baie d'Urfé for dental and medical facilities — the 
creation of a dental-medical building in the area in question »l3° 
In a similar case it was held that the redevelopment of the center city 
and the added fiscal revenues resulting from the erection of new commercial 
buildings were sufficient public interest objectives to justify relaxing by 
amending by-law the normal off-street parking requirements of the zoning 
regulations m . 
These latter cases 132 reveal that the Courts are restrained in the exercise 
of judicial control on questions of public interest. Such restraint comes from 
129. C.S.M., n° 500-05-008365-767, May 9, 1980, Aranovitch J. 
130. W.,atp. 6. 
131. Blande. Beaconsßeld, C.S.M., n° 05-015489-808, January 29, 1981, Barbeau J. 
132. See also Napier c. Winnipeg, (1962) 67 Man. R. 322 (Man. Q.B., Monnin J.). 
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the fact that they cannot be concerned with the wisdom or opportunity of a 
policy decision without then substituting their opinion for that of an elected 
council ' " . It is only when there is no justifiable public interest present in a 
planning amending by-law that will they intervene. Should the question be 
debatable, they will favor the will of the council as expressed in the by-law 
under scrutiny. 
After a perusal of some of the issues before the courts in matters of 
municipal planning, one cannot help to notice the greater extent of judicial 
involvement over local planning policies. Because the Land Use Planning and 
Development Act has maintained the tradition of regulatory controls at the 
local level, the courts have been keeping abreast of the development of the 
local planning function and have continued to exercise their supervisory 
powers over delegated legislation. The contrast between the role of the 
courts over local planning and their role in the field of agricultural land 
preservation is a reminder that, in our jurisdiction at least, a regulatory 
system of land use planning still has a lot to offer in terms of protection of 
the individual against the possible abuse of the state. 
Conclusion 
We have chosen the field of planning law to illustrate the role of the 
courts in the protection of property rights and in their exercise of their power 
of judicial review over municipal corporations. Planning law offers the 
possibility of interesting comparisons between the British and Quebec 
systems both when they offer similarities such as those existing between the 
British Planning system and the Quebec agricultural land protection regime 
and when they exhibit radical differences such as those that exist between 
British planning and local planning in Quebec and Canada. 
Planning law also offers a diversity of issues not present in other fields 
of municipal law like local taxation. Furthermore, it transcends local 
government law with the direct involvement of provincial public agencies 
such as the Commission de protection du territoire agricole, in the field of 
planning. 
The Courts have to adapt to these different circumstances and situations 
in order to play their supervisory role and insure their ability to provide 
redress to those whose rights have been affected by planning policies. In the 
field of agricultural protection due process and questions of fairness have 
been paramount along with problems of jurisdiction. In matter of local 
133. Sillery c. Sun Oil Co., [1964] S.C.R. 552 reng [1962] B.R. 914. 
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planning there have been refinements in judicial control over delegated 
legislation and the courts are more and more able and ready to provide 
substantive protection to aggrieved individuals. 
Coping with unfettered and unappealable discretion is, in our opinion, 
the biggest problem facing the Quebec Courts in the field of planning law 
today. While we have been looking at the Act to Preserve Agricultural 
Land114 this statute in but one, albeit the harshest, in a series of legislative 
interventions designed to cope with planning problems by giving adminis-
trative authorities discretionary powers on a case by case basis instead of 
relying on traditional regulatory powers as in the case of local planning. The 
protection of cultural property U5 the preservation of housing stock 136 and, 
to a lesser extent, the protection of the physical environment13? are examples 
of such an approach. Given the scarcity of protective measures incorporated 
in those statutes such as rights of appeals, it becomes the duty of the courts 
to pursue a policy of active judicial review. 
134. Supra, note 3. 
135. Supra, note 2. 
136. Supra, note 4. 
137. Supra, note 1. 
